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Summary 
Our societies are heterogeneous in many dimensions such as census, education, religion, 
ethnic and cultural composition. The links between individuals - e.g. by friendship, 
marriage or collaboration - are not evenly distributed, but rather tend to be concentrated 
within the same group.  This phenomenon, called imbreeding homophily, has been 
related to either (social) preference for links with own--type individuals ( choice-based 
homophily) or to the prevalence of individuals of her same type in the choice set of an 
individual ( opportunity-based homophily). We propose an indicator to distinguish 
between these effects for minority groups. This is based on the observation that, in 
environments with unbiased opportunities, as the relative size of the minority gets 
small, individuals of the minority rarely meet and have the chance to establish links 
together. Therefore the effect of choice--based homophily gets weaker and weaker as 
the size of the minority shrinks.   We test this idea across the dimensions of race and 
education on data on US marriages, and across race on friendships in US schools, and 
find that: for what concerns education i) opportunity--based homophily is much stronger 
than choice--based homophily and ii) they are both remarkably stationary in time; 
concerning race iii) school friendships do not exhibit opportunity-based homophily, 
while marriages do, iv) choice-based homophily is much stronger for marriages than for 
friendships and v) these effects vary widely across race. 
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Our societies are heterogeneous in many dimensions such as census, education, religion, ethnic and
cultural composition. The links between individuals { e.g. by friendship, marriage or collaboration
{ are not evenly distributed, but rather tend to be concentrated within the same group. This
phenomenon, called imbreeding homophily, has been related to either (social) preference for links with
own{type individuals (choice{based homophily) or to the prevalence of individuals of her same type in
the choice set of an individual (opportunity{based homophily). We propose an indicator to distinguish
between these e®ects for minority groups. This is based on the observation that, in environments
with unbiased opportunities, as the relative size of the minority gets small, individuals of the minority
rarely meet and have the chance to establish links together. Therefore the e®ect of choice{based
homophily gets weaker and weaker as the size of the minority shrinks. We test this idea across the
dimensions of race and education on data on US marriages, and across race on friendships in US
schools, and ¯nd that: for what concerns education i) opportunity{based homophily is much stronger
than choice{based homophily and ii) they are both remarkably stationary in time; concerning race
iii) school friendships do not exhibit opportunity-based homophily, while marriages do, iv) choice-
based homophily is much stronger for marriages than for friendships and v) these e®ects vary widely
across race.
Integration is a major concern of our societies, whose
relevance has increased as an e®ect of globalization. The
prevalence of relations between individuals of the same
type or community over links across types { a well known
phenomenon called (inbreeding) homophily in sociology
[1{8] { has been related to either opportunity{based or
choice{based homophily [5, 7]: while the former (also
called induced homophily) refers to a bias towards same{
type neighbors in the underlying social network, the lat-
ter re°ects a bias towards same{type links in the collec-
tive choice of mutual relations, among those possible in a
given neighborhood of the social network. Here, choice{
based bias depends on the choices of the population as a
whole, and cannot be related to choices of the individual.
For example, Ref. [9] shows that individual choices in°u-
ence in non{trivial ways the aggregate outcome and Ref.
[10] argues that biased mixing of a minority may be due
to homophily of both majority and minority individuals.
Also, the opportunities which an individual faces when
choosing whom to establish a relation with may well
be shaped by past choices of that individual and oth-
ers. For example, T.C. Schelling has vividly shown that
even very weak preferences for homophilous relations in
residential choice, can lead to strong spacial segregation
[11, 12]. However, even if choices in°uence opportunities
across time, it is meaningful to make a distinction be-
tween choices and opportunities the individuals face at a
given time.
There are many dimensions (ethnical, religion, educa-
tion, age, census etc.) which are likely to in°uence, to
di®erent degrees, the formation of links between individ-
uals, and these are correlated in complex ways. Disen-
tangling their e®ect is a non-trivial task [13, 14]. Still it
makes sense to discuss biases in the choices and oppor-
tunities along a single dimension, provided due caution
is paid in drawing causal relations. This is particularly
true in cases where the pattern of interaction is shaped
by institutions. For example, friendships between school
students is a matter of individual choice but their pat-
tern of interaction is largely shaped by institutions (clubs,
sport teams, academic tracking [15], etc). So while it is
natural to expect choice{based homophily, the presence
of opportunity{based homophily may be a matter of con-
cern for policy makers.
Our aim, in the present work, is to provide an indica-
tor which separates the e®ects of opportunity{based ho-
mophily (OBH) and of choice{based homophily (CBH)
for a minority group inside a larger population. The idea
is that, in the absence of opportunity biases, CBH has an
e®ect which is proportional to the size of the minority,
when the latter is small, simply because individuals of
that minority have no opportunities to meet. Therefore,
an excess of inter-type links in very small minorities must
be due to OBH.
To be more precise, let q be the ratio of same{type
links for a member of a minority and let p be the relative
size (frequency) of this minority. Following Coleman [17],





which is the excess of minority type links normalized so
that baseline homophily (q = p) [2] corresponds to H = 0
and complete segregation (q = 1) yields H = 1. H(p)
depends non{linearly on p [3, 8, 9], but for small p, we
can assume [18]
H(p) ' A + Bp : (2)2
The above observation implies that we should have A = 0
in a population of homophilous individuals, with no
OBH. Therefore, A can be taken as an index of OBH.
This general observation can be detailed in a simple prob-
abilistic model, which explicitly takes into account the
two e®ects (see Model). OBH is modeled by the fre-
quency ¼ of the minority in the typical neighborhood of
the social network of a minority individual, for p ! 0.
The actual social relations are chosen on the social net-
work thus de¯ned, with a same{type link of minority indi-
viduals being chosen x times more likely than a di®erent{






























Add Health schools: p<10%
FIG. 1: IPUMS data for the Black minority (above) are based
on same{race marriages in American States [19]. Each point
represents the Black minority in one State in one of the three
surveys (1980, 1990, 2000). On the x{axis we have the per-
centage of the minority (the maximum threshold is 10%).
On the y{axis the Imbreeding Homophily measure de¯ned
in (1). Lines represent linear ¯ts for each survey. Add Health
data (below) are based on same{race friendships in American
schools [20]. Each point represents a minority in one school.
Linear ¯ts are made for each minority.
We illustrate this idea on empirical data on marriages
[19] and friendships [20], where individuals are identi¯ed
by race and (in marriages) by the level of education at-
tained. The datasets pertain to di®erent environments {
IPUMS marriages in US states
no threshold n B § A § x § ¼ §
Top Educ. 1980 51 0.7 0.4 0.22 0.04 1.2 0.7 0.113 0.04
Top Educ. 1990 51 1.0 0.3 0.20 0.04 1.5 0.5 0.089 0.02
Top Educ. 2000 51 1.1 0.3 0.19 0.04 1.7 0.4 0.081 0.02
10% threshold
Black 1980 30 3.7 1.1 0.65 0.06 29.4 13.4 0.057 0.02
Black 1990 30 5.0 1.0 0.50 0.04 20.1 5.4 0.046 0.01
Black 2000 30 5.3 1.4 0.38 0.06 13.7 4.3 0.040 0.01
Asian 1980 50 8.3 4.0 0.38 0.06 21.9 11.3 0.026 0.01
Asian 1990 50 4.8 2.3 0.45 0.06 15.6 8.3 0.046 0.02
Asian 2000 49 5.5 2.2 0.47 0.06 19.1 8.7 0.042 0.02
Native 1980 50 6.8 1.6 0.16 0.04 9.6 2.5 0.018 0.01
Native 1990 50 4.5 1.3 0.14 0.04 6.2 1.8 0.023 0.01
Native 2000 49 4.1 1.3 0.17 0.04 5.9 2.0 0.029 0.01
Hispanic 1980 50 6.5 2.7 0.41 0.06 18.4 8.4 0.034 0.01
Add Health friendships in US schools
Black 39 5.6 1.0 0.01 0.39 5.7 4.7 0.001 0.06
Asian 56 3.3 1.3 0.01 0.04 3.4 1.3 0.002 0.01
Hispanic 55 0.9 0.7 -0.02 0.04 0.8 0.6 -0.010 0.02
TABLE I: Every line represents a minority in one survey. For
the ¯rst three the minority Top Educ. represents all those
people who have spent at least 4 years in college. For the
remaining lines the minority is represented by a race. n is
the number of observations. We compute A, B and their 95%
con¯dence interval, with a linear regression of p versus H.
In the cases concerning education there is no threshold on p.
(the reason for this is that p has almost doubled in every State
between 1980 and 2000). For the remaining regressions we
take only those p below 10% (results are qualitatively robust
to a change of this threshold). We compute x, ¼, and their
relative 95% con¯dence interval, with the model described in
the Model.
single American States for marriages [19] or single schools
for friendships [20] { with di®erent relative share p of mi-
nority individuals. For each environment, we measure
the inbreeding homophily index H and compute A and
B from a linear ¯t for small p, ¼ and x are computed from
the model (see Model). Fig. 1 shows a sample of the re-
sults which are collected in Table I. The top panel shows
the ¯t of H(p) for marriages in the minority of Blacks, in
three subsequent surveys (1980, 1990 and 2000). First,
we observe strong CBH (x), which is also observed for
other types (see Table I). Also notice that A > 0, indi-
cating OBH (¼ > 0), though this e®ect has been declining
over time. OBH in marriages is observed also for other
minorities, but it is close to negligible for Native Amer-
icans, and its time dependence is much weaker. On the
contrary, CBH and OBH are remarkably stable across
time with respect to education, to the point that data
appears to lie on the same master line, though p values
have increased of 46% from 1980 to 2000.
In school friendships (bottom panel), choice{based ho-
mophily is still high and signi¯cative, but much less than
for the marriages considered above. Also here x strongly
varies from race to race. It is moreover acceptable, for all
the regressions and all the races, to assume that A, and
hence ¼ is equal to 0, implying no OBH. This is what we
would assume from an environment like a school, where
the class formation should be independent on races [15].3
Summarizing, we have proposed a method to disentan-
gle choice{based from opportunity{based sources of ho-
mophily (CBH and OBH respectively). Our case study
on two data sets shows that, for what concerns marriages
alone: (i) OBH is stronger for top educated people than
for any racial minority, but CBH is much weaker. (ii)
Looking at di®erent time windows, for marriages, there is
a clear decrease of both measures of homophily for Blacks
between 1980, 1990 and 2000. This time{dependence is
not so evident for the other races and especially not for
top educated people. For what concerns the racial di-
mension: (iii) School friendships do not exhibit OBH
(compared to the school population), while marriages
do. (iv) CBH is much stronger for marriages than for
friendships. (v) The values of both are strictly race{
dependent: Blacks exhibit the strongest CBH and (in
marriages, if compared to the population of the Ameri-
can States) OBH; Hispanics exhibit the lowest values of
both (which could be both accepted as unin°uent in the
school data).
There are several interesting extensions of our analysis
to other dimensions such as religion or census. The out-
come of our analysis needs to be critically evaluated, as
our distinction between choice and external constraints is
theoretical at best. If anything, it may help in identify-
ing those institutional constraints which hamper fruitful
exchanges between members of our society.
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APPENDIX: THE MODEL
We imagine a society whose individuals are ex-ante di-
vided in di®erent types, whose number N is ¯xed and
large. Let p be the fraction of a particular minority in
the population. The local environment of each individ-
ual is de¯ned by an underlying social network, with K
links for each individuals. K is supposed to represent the
number of possible links from which the actual relations
(marriage, friendship, etc) of a particular individual are
drawn. We assume that K is (much) larger than the
actual number k of relations each individual establishes,
but much smaller than N (for schools, k » 6 whereas
K » 30 may be taken as the typical class size, and N
is in the order of hundreds). Individuals are distributed
inhomogeneously on the social network, in such a way
that the average frequency of the minority in the neigh-
borhood of a minority individual is
¹ p(p) = ¼ + (1 ¡ ¼)p ; (A.1)
with ¼ 2 (0;1). The relation is taken to be linear for
simplicity, with ¹ p(1) = 1.
We assume each individual of the minority has k links,
and we assign them in the following way: i) choose an
individual of the minority at random, ii) if he still has an
unassigned link, choose one of the unassigned links in her
neighborhood with a statistical weight 1+x times larger
for links to minority individuals than to majority ones;
iii) stop when all links of the minority are assigned. For
marriages we consider a bipartite network in which all
neighbors of an individual are of the opposite sex. x has
a naÄ ³ve interpretation in term of utility in discrete choice
models [21], but it also re°ects more complex aspects of
the matching problem (see e.g. [9]).




(1+x)¹ p+(1¡¹ p) same{type links,
k
1¡¹ p
(1+x)¹ p+(1¡¹ p) di®erent{type links.
(A.2)
Therefore the ratio q of same{type links, in the whole
population, over all links is q '
¹ p(1+x)










p + O(p2) (A.3)
from which we can read the values of A and B in Eq.
(2). Likewise, from A and B we can infer that
x '
B
(1 ¡ A)2 , ¼ '
A(1 ¡ A)
1 ¡ A + B
: (A.4)
As a check, we generated synthetic data sets using the
model, with x and ¼ given in Table I, and performed a
linear regression of H(p). The resulting values of A0 and
B0 were found to be within the 95% con¯dence inter-
vals reported in Table I for A and B, in almost all cases.
We attribute the discrepancy to a systematic bias due to
non{linear terms in H(p) [18]. These e®ects are particu-
larly strong when x is large. These issues would require
a more sophisticated estimation techniques, which goes
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